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Introduction
The evaluation of the quality, in whichever way defined, of default predictions in the credit industry has received considerable attention recently (Carey 2002 , Engelmann et al. 2003 and many others). In particular, there is a growing interest in comparing the accuracy of competing rating agencies, or to rate the raters, so to speak. In the wake of Basel II, there will be a rapidly increasing number of rating producers, in addition to the established rating agencies, and an increasing number of borrowers who are rated by at least two of them, so it is natural to ask: which rater rates best?
This question can be answered in a variety of ways. The most popular method is based on the accuracy ratio, i.e. on how successful a rating system is in bucketing the defaults in the "bad" grades, or its equivalent, the area under the ROC-curve (see section 4 or Sobehard and Keenan 2001 for a convenient introduction). A rating system is optimal in this sense if its worst grades end up with comprising all the defaults, and none of the non-defaults, i.e. if all defaults are rated worse than non-defaults. What is exactly meant by attaching one of the worst grades to a particular debtor is of no importance here, what matters is simply that debtors who later on default are considered riskier than debtors who do not default.
Below, we follow a different approach by viewing ratings as predicted probabilities of default, and by comparing the accuracy of these predictions across rating agencies. In doing so, we borrow heavily from mathematical statistics, where the evaluation of probability forecasts has a long and distinguished history (see e.g. DeGroot and Fienberg 1983, Vardeman and Meeden 1983, DeGroot and Eriksson 1985, or Winkler 1994 Winkler , 1996 . So far, this methodology has mostly been applied to weather forecasts (i.e. forecasts of the probability of rain) but it can easily be extended to default predictions in the rating industry.
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The practical relevance of this exercise is obvious: The Basel II agreement will leave banks no choice but be attach predicted probabilities of default to all outstanding dept, so the ability to judge the quality of probability forcasts will be essential both for the banking business and for investors as well. If one could show, for instance, that one rater is better able to predict probabilities of default than another one, then its ratings should be more influential as concerns the yields of bonds rated by both of them, not to mention the ability to require higher fees.
As an example, we consider 1927 borrowers, mostly industrial firms and financial institutions from the US (68 % of all borrowers), who had a credit rating by both Moody's and S&P as of Dec. 31, 1998. We follow these firms up to the end of 2002 and record all defaults. The data were obtained from Bloomberg and are available from the authors on request.
Below we apply various orderings of probability forecasts to this data set.
As these orderings are scattered in the statistics literature, we start by collecting and briefly reviewing them in section 2. Section 3 is concerned with mapping rating grades to probabilities of default, and section 4 compares the performance of the ratings, both in terms of partial orderings and in terms of various scalar measures of performance which have been suggested in the literature. Section 5 addresses the statistical significance of the observed differences in performance, and a brief discussion of the shortcomings of our analysis in section 6 concludes.
Partial orderings of probability forecasts
Let 0 = a 1 < a 2 < . . . < a k = 1 be k predicted probabilities of default. In practice, k varies from 6 to about 20. The US-based Loan Pricing Corporation has k = 10. The rating agencies which concern us in the present paper, Moody's 3 and S&P , both have scales with k = 21 (taking account of modifiers such as + and -or 1, 2 and 3). For ease of comparability with these established agencies, most commercial banks also employ scales with k = 21 in their post Basel II internal rating systems.
Below we take the mechanism employed for the predictions as given. Producing the predictions is a separate problem which has engendered an enormous literature, but will not concern us here. Rather, our point of departure is the discrete bivariate probability function r(θ, a j ); θ = 0, 1; j = 1, ..., k, resulting from some such method, whichever it may be, with θ = 1 indicating default and θ = 0 indicating non-default.
The following additional notation will be used:
q(a j ) := relative frequency with which default probability forecast a j is made.
= conditional relative frequency of default given probability forecast a j .
= conditional relative frequency of no default given probability forecast a j .
= conditional relative frequency of predicted default probability a j given default.
= conditional relative frequency of predicted default probability a j given no default.
The problem is: given two forecasters A and B, characterized by their respective bivariate probability functions r A (θ, a j ) and r B (θ, a j ), which one is "better"?
One sensible requirement is that among borrowers with predicted default probability a j , the relative percentage of defaults will be roughly equal to a j . Formally:
whenever q(a j ) > 0. Such forecasters are called "well calibrated" (DeGroot and Fienberg 1983).
However, calibration, though desirable, is not sufficient for a useful forecast.
For instance, a probability forecaster attaching default probability p(1) to all borrowers is well calibrated but otherwise quite useless. 
Equation (1) means that, given A's forecast a j , an additional independent randomisation is applied according to the conditional distribution M ij (j = 1, ..., k) which produces forecasts with the same probability function as that of B. Condition (2) ensures that the resulting forecast is again well calibrated. The refinement ordering among well calibrated probability forecasters 
and this condition is violated for C and D in our example.
Vardeman and Meeden (1983) suggest to alternatively order probability forecasters according to the concentration of defaults in the "bad" grades. This will here be called the VM-default order. Formally:
Or to put this differently: A dominates B in the Vardeman-Meeden default ordering if its conditional distribution, given default, first-order stochastically dominates that of B.
The same can be done for the non-defaults. A is better than B in the VM-nondefault sense if non-defaults are more frequent in the "good" grades. Formally:
A final criterion which is favoured in the banking industry (see e.g. Falkenstein et al. 2000) is based on joining the points (0, 0),
by straight lines. The resulting plot is variously called the power curve, the Lorenz curve, the Gini curve, or the cumulative accuracy profile, and a forecaster A is considered better than a forecaster B in this -the Gini-default-sense
The Gini-curve would be diagonal if ratings were unrelated to defaults. Therefore, the area between the Gini-curve and the diagonal line can be viewed as measuring the quality of the forecasts -the larger the area, the better the forecasts. This area, divided by the area obtained from forecasts where all defaults are rated worse than non defaults, is called the accuracy ratio; it is the most popular measure of forecasting performance in the banking industry.
3 Mapping rating grades to default probabilities Next, we apply the orderings described above to real world default predictions. This percentage of split ratings corresponds to figures reported elsewhere, for instance in Ederington (1986) . The reasons for such split ratings are a topic of independent interest and shall not concern us here. For instance split ratings might be an artefact of different procedures used for producing the ratings. fit an exponential curve to the observed default frequencies in order to obtain a smooth and increasing sequence of default probabilities. Such issues will not be touched upon in this paper, as we are mainly concerned with systematic differences in forecasting ability, not with short-run effects induced by random deviations from a long run performance standard. The upshot is that, even if one does not fully believe in the mapping introduced above, the following empirical comparison is still useful as a kind of "what if"-analysis which shows how to proceed if forecasts were indeed of a probabilistic kind.
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4 The relative performance of the probability forecasts
We start by checking the partial orderings from Section 2. Figure 1 shows the Moody's and S&P power curves, as derived from table 2, with + andsubdivisions lumped together. It is seen that the power curves intersect, albeit slightly, so the rating agencies cannot be compared according to this criterion. Gini-ordering, they cannot be compared to the VM-ordering a forteriori.
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The most one could hope for is comparability according to either VM(d) or VM(nd), but not according to both (in the sense that one dominates the other according to both criteria). This is exactly what we find. As to the refinement ordering, we have to check calibration first. Here we have the problem that the data are not consistent with the fact that both agencies are well calibrated, at least if the distribution q(a j ) of borrowers across rating grades a j from table 2 can be viewed as typical for the agencies. A necessary condition for calibration is that the overall predicted relative frequency of default p(1) be the same for both agencies. Plugging the default probabilities a j from table 3 into the general formula
shows that we obtain different results for Moody's and for S&P. This is so no matter which column of table 3 is used for the predicted default probabilities a j .
For instance, taking our own estimates from column 3 gives P
S&P
(1) = 9.89%
and P
M
(1) = 11.80%. For other columns, discrepancies are even larger.
One way out of this dilemma is to acknowledge that the equivalence of the rating grades established in table 3 is not quite correct, i.e. that a rating of BBB by S&P implies a (slightly) different predicted probability of default than a rating of Baa2 by Moody's. This in turn implies that we have k = 14 rather than k = 7 predicted probabilities of default (taking table 3 as our point of departure), with the probabilities themselves given for instance by columns 4 and 5. Plugging these probabilities into formula (8) gives p(1) = 8.02% for Moody's and p(1) = 7.15% for S&P, so we still have the result that calibration for both agencies is inconsistent with the data.
However, if we identify realized default frequencies with predicted ones, both agencies are well calibrated by definition. It then makes sense to check whether one is more refined than the other. We call this the empirical refinement ordering. Table 5 gives the results. It shows that the integrals of the distribution functions intersect, so none of the agencies is in this sense more refined than the other. The non-comparability of the default predictions in terms of the empirical refinement ordering implies that different scalar measures of performance will rank the predictions differently (Krämer 2006) . Most popular among these is the Brier score (Brier 1950) , defined as where p i is the predicted probability of default, and θ i = 1 in case of default 
If we attach to each borrower the default probability from table 3, column 3, we obtain
and if we attach to each borrower the observed default rate of the class these borrower has been sorted into, we obtain
As small values of the Brier score are "good", Moody's outperforms S&P according to this criterion. It also outperforms S&P according to the logarithmic score, defined as
The logarithmic score is always negative, with closeness to zero signalling a good performance. For our data set, it takes the following values if default probabilities from table 3 are used: As large values of the logarithmic score are "good", Moody's outperform S&P also according to this criterion. They also outperform S&P according to the spherical score, defined as However, it is easy to find scores such that this ranking is reversed. This reversal is made possible by the noncomparability of Moody's and S&P in terms of the empirical refinement ordering. It is well known that second order stochastic
for all continuous convex functions g on the unit interval. On the other hand, it is also well known (see e.g. Winkler 1996 ; the basic theorem is due to Savage 1971) that, for well calibrated forecasters, all proper scoring rules S(p 1 , . . . , p n ; θ 1 , . . . , θ n ) depend on the p i and θ i only via the a j 's and can be written as
with some strictly convex function g. For the Brier score, for instance, we have
If second order stochastic dominance fails, one can therefore always find two convex functions f and g (corresponding to two proper scoring rules S f and S g ) such that the ranking of two forecasters is reversed.
An example is the asymmetric version L * of the logarithmic score suggested by Winkler (1994) : 
Statistical Significance
Next we explicitly acknowledge the randomness in our data and briefly comment on the statistical significance of the differences in performance which we have found. For instance, the accuracy ratios derived from figure 1 are 0.833 for Moody's (AR M ) and 0.819 for S & P (AR S ), so there is a slight but insignificant advantage for Moody's here. Engelmann et al. (2003) show that the
is asymptotically chi-squared with one degree of freedom. is met in the credit rating context. If we consider the 1927 ratings from the present paper as a random sample from a hypothetical universe of potential ratings, then the sample sizes n 1 and n 2 are not fixed but random and perfectly negatively correlated. And more importantly, a sample of n observations from the bivariate distribution r(θ, a) will in practice never be simple as the observed θ's are known to be positively correlated in practice. As the observed values of θ and a for a given borrower are also highly correlated, this can then be shown to translate into correlation among draws from the conditional distributions q(a|1) and q(a|0), which are therefore not a simple random sample.
As H 0 in our case is not rejected anyway, we do not investigate this issue any further here.
The same argument applies even more forcefully when assessing the significance of the difference of other scalar measures of performance. For the Brier score, it is easily seen (see e.g. Redelmeier et al. 1991 ) that the statistic
where
, is asymptotically standard normal when population Brier scores are identical. In our sample, Z takes the value 3.80, which at first sight is highly significant. However, as in the case of the Engelmann et al. Tstatistic, its limiting null distribution obtains only for simple random samples, which in the rating context will almost never be observed in practice due to the positive correlation among the θ's. Diebold and Mariano (1995) show how to account for such correlations in a time series context. This approach might well translate into a cross-section environment, but we do not investigate this here any further since, for our data set, there do not seem to exist significant differences anyway.
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Discussion
The basic message of our empirical application is that none of the two leading rating agencies seems to uniformly outperform the other (uniformly across measures of performance), confirming independent results from e.g. Ederington et al. (1987) or Moon and Stotsky (1993) , who show that ratings by either agency convey information not contained in the rating of the other.
There are some shortcomings in our data, however. For instance, in order to obtain a reasonable data base, we had to collect all ratings as of Dec. 31, 1998 irrespective of the date the rating was produced or changed. This implies that the relative default frequencies from columns (1) -(3) in table 3 are for a horizon of slightly more than four years. For insurance, if a rating was issued on July 1 1998, the time horizon for default is four years and a half.
However, as "no change" need not imply "no assessment of creditworthyness", and since both Moody's and S&P are known for keeping a close track of their customers, the presumption is that the ratings observed in December 1998 closely mirror the then prevailing creditworthiness of the firms considered in our empirical example. Also, there are no large deviations in the age of the ratings between Moody's and S&P, so this "ragged edge" problem is unlikely to favor either of them.
Another question of course is whether or not our sample can be taken as typical for the performance of the agencies. It does not for instance cover a full business cycle but rather the end and apex of an extraordinary upswing and the beginning of a downturn in 2001 and 2002, were the majority of the defaults occurred. This might bias the absolute performance of both rating agencies. But since we are mainly concerned with relative performance, this possible sample bias is probably not as serious as it might seem at first sight.
